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Abstract
We analyze optimal contractual forms and equilibrium matching in a double-sided
moral hazard model of sharecropping similar to Eswaran and Kotwal (1985). We
show that, with endogenous matching, the presence of moral hazard can reverse the
matching pattern relative to the rst best, and that even if sharecropping is optimal
for an exogenously given pair of agent skills, it may not be observed in equilibrium
with endogenous matching. The economy with endogenous matching features less
sharecropping compared to an economy with agent skills drawn at random from the
same distribution. This suggests that studies of agency costs in sharecropping may
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1 Introduction
The choice of contractual form in agriculture, in particular, the choice between wage, xed
rent, or sharecropping contracts has important implications for productive e¢ ciency. Alter-
native theories of choice of contractual form generate sharply di¤erent predictions about the
e¢ ciency of sharecropping and the potential e¤ects of agricultural reforms or policies such as
tenancy or land reform.1 For example, in models that involve moral hazard and wealth con-
straints (e.g., Mookherjee, 1997 or Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak, 2002), a tenancy or land
reform that gives a higher share or transfers ownership rights to tenants would unambigu-
ously improve productive e¢ ciency. On the other hand, Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) develop
a model of contractual choice where sharecropping is a way of pooling non-contractible in-
puts of landowners and tenants, and in the context of this model, a tenancy reform would
reduce rather than increase productive e¢ ciency by limiting the e¢ cient division of labour.
These alternative theories, however, take the pattern of matching between landlords
and tenants (and land quality and tenant ability) as exogenously given. A more recent
literature has begun to pay attention to the important issue of endogenous matching and its
implications for the observed distribution of contractual forms and e¢ ciency (e.g., Legros
and Newman, 1996, 2002 and 2007; Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; Serfes, 2005; Dam and
Perez-Castrillo, 2006; Alonso-Pauli and Perez-Castrillo, 2012).2
We contribute to the literature on contractual choice in agriculture by introducing en-
dogenous matching in a double-sided moral hazard model similar to the classic Eswaran and
Kotwal (1985) model. We extend and recast their analysis in an equilibrium matching setting
and show that selection e¤ects matter for contractual choices for example, if sharecropping
is optimal for an exogenously given pair of skill types it may not be observed in equilibrium
with endogenous matching. We also compare the likelihood of observing sharecropping in
our endogenous matching setting with that in an economy in which landlord and tenant skill
levels are drawn at random from distribution with the same support and probabilities and
show that sharecropping is less likely with endogenous matching.
We model the interplay of two economic forces in the context of organizing agricultural
production, namely incentive provision under double-sided moral hazard and matching. The
choice of tenancy organization form is inuenced by these two important factors. On the
one hand, it is shaped by incentive considerations since, more often than not in reality, the
characteristics or actions of contract parties are unobservable and need to be revealed or
implemented through constrained-optimal contract design. On the other hand, the organi-
zational structure depends on the relative importance of the inputs that contracting parties
bring in. By pooling various inputs organizations can exploit specialization and absolute
advantage.3 In general, the gains from specialization have to be balanced against the agency
costs stemming from incentive problems.
1See Singh (1989) for a review of the literature on sharecropping tenancy and Banerjee (1999) for a
review of the literature on land reform. More recent empirical contributions on the e¢ ciency e¤ects of
tenancy reforms include Banerjee et al. (2002) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011).
2We discuss this literature and our contribution with respect to it below.
3As in Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), absolute advantage is key to specialization by task in sharecropping.
Unlike in trade models, comparative advantage without absolute advantage (e.g., one party better at both
tasks) does not lead to a partnership.
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To x ideas, suppose agricultural production depends on the labor e¤ort and the skill
(ability, productivity) supplied by each of two parties, the landlord and the tenant. Indi-
viduals di¤er in their skill levels. As Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) put it, sharecropping can
be viewed as a partnershipin which each partner provides the unmarketed input in which
he is better endowed or has an absolute advantage. For example, landowners may have an
absolute advantage in managerial skills related to technology and market information while
tenants may have an absolute advantage in labour supervision. Sharecropping pools ability
but is subject to agency problems in e¤ort provision. To give more incentives to one party
means giving less incentives to the other. If ability and e¤ort are complements in produc-
tion, the higher the relative skill of one agent, the higher should be his output share. This
means that he might be optimally matched with a low-skill agent. However, this undermines
the gains from trade due to specialization, since a match with a high-ability person would
produce more output. If the incentive costs outweigh the gains from specialization, share-
cropping may not be observed in equilibrium and the high-ability agent may instead simply
hire a low-ability agent from the market to work for him or produce on his own (correspond-
ing to xed-wage or xed-rent contracts). That is, simply pooling ability is not a su¢ cient
argument for sharecropping su¢ ciently strong complementarities between the qualities of
the supplied inputs (the agentsskills) are also needed, otherwise with endogenous matching
sharecropping may not be observed in equilibrium.
We show that the presence of double-sided moral hazard combined with weak comple-
mentarity in input quality in production leads to the possibility of agent skills being strategic
substitutes in joint surplus and a reversal of the equilibrium matching pattern relative to the
rst best, from positive to negative assortative. In contrast, without incentive problems, even
a small amount of complementarity between the quality of inputs implies positive assortative
matching. This means that when individuals are heterogeneous in their skills, allowing for
endogenous matching between landlords and tenants can a¤ect the optimal choice of contrac-
tual form (sharecropping vs. sole production in xed rent or wage contract) relative to the
setting of Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) where isolated landlord-tenant pairs are considered.
Specically, there exist situations in which sharecropping is the optimal contractual form
for exogenously given pairs of skill types, but with endogenous sorting the landlord or ten-
ant performs both tasks in equilibrium. This has the implication that empirical studies on
agency costs (e.g., see Chiappori and Salanie, 2003 for a review of the contracting literature,
including sharecropping) may underestimate their full extent by focusing on the intensive
margin and ignoring the extensive margin, that is, the fact that sharecropping may not arise
at all and the consequent welfare loss in terms of e¢ cient matching between landowners
and tenants, as opposed to the loss of e¢ ciency due to moral hazard when sharecropping is
actually observed.4
In our theoretical analysis we use the general approach and results from Legros and New-
man (2002), who study matching in transferable-utility economies (their companion paper,
Legros and Newman, 2007 analyzes the non-transferable utility case) with or without mar-
ket imperfections and provide weaker conditions for monotone matching than the standard
sub- and super-modularity results from the earlier literature. Legros and Newman also give
4This ts Bastiats general dictum that an economist must take into account both what is seen and what
is not seen (Bastiat, 1873).
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examples of payo¤ functions in imperfect markets settings in which the equilibrium match-
ing pattern is reversed (e.g., from positive to negative assortative) by changing a model
parameter which could be interpreted as the strengthof the market imperfection. In our
application to contractual choice in agriculture we echo this by showing that the fact that a
market imperfection exists, here arising endogenously from the moral hazard problem, can
reverse the matching pattern relative to the rst best by a¤ecting the optimal e¤ort choices
made by the match parties.
The classical optimal sorting literature (e.g., Becker, 1993, Sattinger, 1975) has argued
that the sub- or super-modularity of the payo¤ function is closely related to whether the
agentscharacteristics over which matching is done (here, the skill levels) are substitutes or
complements. With substitutes, negative assortative matching arises, while with comple-
ments the matching is positive assortative. As pointed out by Legros and Newman (2002),
however, the link between the degree of substitutability of agentscharacteristics and the
modularity of the payo¤ function may break down in more general environments featuring
credit market imperfections (e.g., Legros and Newman, 1996; Sadoulet, 1998); restrictions
on how output is shared (e.g., Farrell and Scotchmer, 1998); or particular production tech-
nologies (e.g., Kremer and Maskin, 1996). Our application to contract choice in agriculture
with double-sided moral hazard ts into this list.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature on agricultural tenancy and the role
of matching. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) pose the puzzle that output shares of tenants
cultivating risky crops tend to be higher than those of tenants cultivating less risky crops
which is contrary to the predictions of standard models of sharecropping under moral hazard
in which greater output variance would lead to higher demand for insurance by the risk-averse
tenant and, therefore, lower crop share (e.g., Stiglitz, 1974). Ackerberg and Botticini argue
that risk-neutral tenants are more likely to select riskier crops (and therefore, in equilibrium,
their observed shares could be higher) and provide empirical evidence of matching between
landowners and tenants consistent with this hypothesis. The argument has been formalized
in Serfes (2005).
More generally, our work is related to previous theoretical literature on organizational
choice with endogenous matching. Legros and Newman (1996) build a general equilibrium
model with moral hazard, endogenous rm formation by agents heterogeneous in wealth, and
a credit market with costly state verication problem. They show that, when borrowing is not
costly, rms are e¢ ciently organized and essentially consist of one type of agents but, when
the information problem is su¢ ciently severe, rm organization and production e¢ ciency
depend on the distribution of wealth. Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006) study a principal-
agent model with risk-neutral principal and agents heterogeneous in initial wealth, moral
hazard in e¤ort choice, and limited liability. They analyze the simultaneous determination
of stable pairwise matching and the contracts signed and show that the contracts in a stable
outcome of their economy are more e¢ cient than principal-agent contracts in which the
principals obtain the full surplus.5 Alonso-Pauli and Perez-Castrillo (2012) study endogenous
5Besley and Ghatak (2005) consider a similar setting but allow agents to be intrinsically motivated and
principals and agents to di¤er in terms of their missionpreferences which a¤ect the level of agent motivation.
They analyze the e¤ect of endogenous matching on e¢ ciency, and show that it may reduce incentive pay
since agent and principal mission preferences are better aligned.
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matching between heterogeneous managers and shareholders who can adopt an incentive-
based contract or a code of best practicein a setting with moral hazard. They show that
rms with the best projects tend to adopt a code when managers are not too heterogeneous
while, when projects are similar, the best managers tend to be hired via incentive contracts.
They also show the possibility of reversal in the optimal contract compared to the case of an
exogenous agent pair. Our paper focuses exclusively on incentive problems with double-sided
moral hazard and two-sided matching. In our model there are no limited-liability constraints
and utility is fully transferable. Comparative advantage and not wealth is thus the key source
of heterogeneity that we focus on.6
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and character-
izes the equilibrium matching and joint surplus maximizing organization forms that will be
observed in the rst best and under double-sided moral hazard allowing for a varying degree
of complementarity in agentscharacteristics. We demonstrate the possibility for matching
pattern reversal between the rst best and moral hazard. Several empirically testable im-
plications of the model are discussed in Section 3. The last section makes some concluding
observations.
2 Model
Output depends on the e¤ort levels, e1  0 and e2  0, supplied in two distinct tasks.
Following Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) we call them management and e¤ective labour
e¤ort(which may include supervision of wage labour) or more simply, task 1and task 2.
Production also requires one unit of land. There are two types of economic agents: those
who are better at task 1 and those who are better at task 2. This will be formalized below.
Suppose landlords are good at supplying managerial inputs (task 1) while tenants (who are
assumed to be landless) are good at labour supervision (task 2). Each landlord has a single
unit of land. A landowner (task 1 specialist) could work on both tasks on his own although
he is not very good at task 2. Alternatively, he can rent out the land to a tenant who can
work on both tasks in exchange of xed rent. Finally, the landowner can enter a contract
with a task 2 specialist in a sharecropping arrangement. This allows gains from specialization
to be realized but will be subject to incentive problems when e¤orts are unobservable.
The quality (ability, skill) of a task 1 specialist (the landlord) is 1  1 and the quality of
task 2 specialist (the tenant) is 2  1. Both 1 and 2 take values on the set   [1; max]
where max > 1 can be arbitrarily large but nite. The skill levels, 1 and 2 are observable
and contractible. In contrast, the e¤ort levels e1 and e2 may or may not be contractible.
All agents are risk-neutral and there are no limited liability or wealth constraints.7 This
means that, if it is e¢ cient for the task 2 specialist to become the full residual claimant
(e.g., through a xed-rent contract), then there is nothing preventing that contractual form
being chosen, in contrast to many models of tenancy where a rent-extraction vs. incentives
6A related recent paper by Dam (2010) analyzes a two-sided matching model involving entrepreneurs who
vary in wealth and nancial intermediaries who vary in monitoring ability and shows that, with endogenous
matching, more e¢ cient monitors lend to borrowers with lower wealth.
7We briey discuss the case of wealth constraints at the end of Section 2.3.1 below.
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trade-o¤ exists due to a limited liability constraint, and therefore, even if xed-rent contracts
are e¢ cient (e.g., when both parties are risk-neutral) they will not be chosen.8
Each agent has an additively separable payo¤ in their consumption, c and e¤ort in each
task, u = c   (e1)   (e2). The disutility cost of providing e¤ort is assumed quadratic,
(e1) =
1
2
e21 and (e2) =
1
2
e22. The reservation payo¤ of each agent is set to 0. If a task 1
specialist of skill 1 and a task 2 specialist of skill 2 engage in joint production, output is:
qJ(e1; e2) = 12 + 1e1 + 2e2 + " (1)
where " is a random variable with E(") = 0 and nite variance and  is a parameter capturing
the extent of skill complementarity in production.
Assume that if a task i (i = 1; 2) specialist of type i undertakes production on her own
she can perform task k (k = 1; 2 with k 6= i) just as well as task-k specialist of the lowest
possible type, k = 1. For example, a landlord (task 1 specialist) can produce on his own
but will be only as productive as the lowest-skill tenant at task 2. This puts a natural lower
bound on  otherwise there is no advantage in producing jointly. Given this, if a task i
specialist of skill i undertakes sole production (that is, she works on both tasks either using
own or rented land), output is:
qS(ei; ek) = i + iei + ek + ". (2)
Using (1) and (2), we can write the production function, (1) for any organization type
between agents of skills i and k in  as:
q(ei; ek) = izk + iei + zkek + " (3)
where zk = k if production is done jointly and zk = 1 if the task i specialist is sole producer,
for i; k = 1; 2 with i 6= k.
Assume   0.9 If  = 0 agents abilities are substitutes in production, while their
complementarity increases in  for  > 0. Suppose that each of 1 and 2 can take just two
values, a and b in  with a  b (high skill and low skill). From now on, subscripts 1 and
2 on  pertain to the skill level of the task 1 or 2 specialist, while subscripts a and b on 
denote the numerical value of someones skill level, i.e., i 2 fa; bg for i = 1; 2.
We assume transferable utility, i.e., agents can make any side payments or transfers among
each other. Therefore, there are no restrictions on the level of wage or xed rent coming
from wealth or liquidity constraints, unlike in models with limited liability. Below, we use
the qualier optimalto refer to organization/contract forms that maximize expected joint
payo¤ (total surplus). To determine the equilibrium matching pattern in our economy, we
follow Legros and Newman (2002), henceforth LN(2002) and use the core as our equilibrium
concept.
There are continuum of measure one of task-1 specialists and continuum of measure one
task-2 specialists. Therefore, since land is essential in production, and since there are measure
one land units in total, following LN(2002), we dene an equilibrium in our model economy as
8See for example, Mookherjee (1997) and Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002).
9We rule out the case  < 0 in which higher partner ability reduces the joint payo¤. In this case, if  is
su¢ ciently negative, sole production always dominates joint production.
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consisting of a pairwise matching correspondence between landlords and tenants and payo¤
allocation for each pair (see LN(2002), p.929 for details). Since there is transferable utility,
we only keep track of the total expected payo¤ in each pair which, as well as aggregate
surplus, will be maximized in equilibrium see LN(2002), Proposition 1. Assume for now
(this will be relaxed in Section 2.3.2) that there is an equal measure, 1/2 of each skill level,
a and b for both the landlords and tenants.
Given our assumption of two possible ability levels for each specialist, a  b, let J(i; i),
i = a; b denote the expected total surplus when a landlord and a tenant both with skill i
produce jointly; let J(a; b) denote the expected total surplus when a landlord and tenant of
di¤erent skill levels produce jointly; and let S(i), i = a; b denote the expected total surplus
when an agent of skill i engages in sole production (with own or rented land). We can thus
dene the possible values for expected total surplus in any landlord-tenant pair as follows:
(a; a)  maxfJ(a; a); S(a)g
(a; b)  maxfJ(a; b); S(a)g
(b; b)  maxfJ(b; b); S(b)g. (4)
In writing the expression for (a; b) in (4) we used the fact that qJ is symmetric in 1 and 2
(see (1)) and that S(a)  S(b), i.e., sole production by the low-skill type in a (a; b) pair is
never optimal a low-skill landlord can always rent his land to the high-skill tenant while a
high-skill landlord can produce alone (the low-skill tenant he is matched to can be thought
of sitting idle). To see this, note that
S(i)  max
ei;ek
E(qS(ei; ek))  (ei)  (ek)
which, given the assumed functional forms for output qS(:; :) (see (2)) and e¤ort costs (:),
yields optimal e¤ort choices eSi = i and e
S
k = 1, and so the maximized expected joint surplus
with sole production is
S(a) = 
p
a+
1
2
(a+ 1) and S(b) = 
p
b+
1
2
(b+ 1) (5)
where we call a  (a)2 and b  (b)2 to simplify the notation. Clearly, S(a)  S(b) whenever
a  b.
The expected total surplus under joint-production, J(a; a), J(a; b) and J(a; b) will be
determined below since its form depends on the contractibility of e¤ort.
2.1 First Best
As a benchmark, we rst characterize the rst best, that is, the case when both e¤orts e1
and e2 are contractible. Under joint production and no incentive problems, e1 and e2 are
chosen by the agents to maximize total expected surplus, i.e., we have,
J(i; j)  max
e1;e2
E(qJ(e1; e2))  (e1)  (e2)
which, given our assumed functional forms for output qJ(:; :) and e¤ort costs (:), yields
rst-best optimal e¤orts eJ1 = 1 and e
J
2 = 2 where i; i = 1; 2 denotes the skill level of the
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type-i specialist in the pair. Plugging in, and using the superscript FB to denote the rst
best, we obtain:
JFB(a; a) = a+ a, JFB(b; b) = b+ b
and JFB(a; b) = 
p
ab+
1
2
(a+ b):
where a  (a)2 and b  (b)2 as before. We have the following straightforward result:
Lemma 1: In the rst best, joint production is the joint-surplus maximizing
organization form for any agent pair with skills 1; 2 2 fa; bg. That is,
FB(i; j) = JFB(i; j) for (i; j) 2 f(a; a); (a; b); (b; b)g.
Proof: We simply check all three cases. JFB(a; a)  S(a) is equivalent to a + a 

p
a + 1
2
(a + 1) which is true since a  1. Similarly for b. We also have JFB(a; b) =

p
ab+ 1
2
(a+ b)  pa+ 1
2
(a+ 1) = S(a) since b  1.
Given Lemma 1, we next characterize the equilibrium matching pattern in the rst best.
Proposition 1 (First best)
Suppose agent e¤orts are contractible. Then, for any   0, in equilibrium there
is joint production with positive assortative matching of the segregation type,
(a; a) and (b; b).
Proof: We already showed in Lemma 1 that FB(i; j) = JFB(i; j) for (i; j) 2 f(a; a); (a; b); (b; b)g.
Following LN (2002), dene the surplus function, FB as:
FB(a; b)  maxf0; FB(a; b)  1
2
(FB(a; a) + FB(b; b))g
= maxf0; JFB(a; b)  1
2
(JFB(a; a) + JFB(b; b))g
=
1
2
maxf0; 2
p
ab+ a+ b  a  a  b  bg
=
1
2
maxf0; (pa 
p
b)2g
= 0 for all a; b and   0:
The proposition statement then follows directly from Proposition 4 in LN(2002), p.932.
As pointed out in LN(2002), the surplus function FB being identically zero is a much
weaker condition for segregation than strict super-modularity of the joint payo¤ function,
FB (note, super-modularity does not hold here for  = 0). The intuition for the Proposition
1 result is similar to that in Beckers model of the marriage market when agentstypes
are complements in the joint payo¤, positive assortative matching (henceforth, PAM) results
(e.g., Becker, 1993, ch. 4). Clearly, this would also hold when there are more than two skill
levels (assuming measure consistency) if there were any heterogeneous pairs, a protable
deviation to segregation PAM supported by appropriate transfers would be possible.
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2.2 Double-sided moral hazard
Now suppose e1 and e2 are non-contractible, that is, joint production has the advantage of
exploiting gains from specialization (the fact that both agents can use their skills 1 and 2
strictly larger than 1 in production) but this has to be traded-o¤against the agency costs that
arise from the double-sided moral hazard problem. Consistent with the tenancy literature,
we restrict attention to linear contracts of the form (s; R) where s 2 [0; 1] represents the
output share of the task 2 specialist (the tenant) and R represents a transfer from the the
task 1 specialist (the landlord) to the tenant which could be negative (a rent) or positive
(a wage).10 Using the superscript MH to denote this setting with moral hazard, given
(s; R) the agentsoptimal e¤ort choices are:
eMH1 = argmax
e1

(1  s) (12 + 1e1 + 2e2) R  e
2
1
2

= (1  s)1
eMH2 = argmax
e2

s(12 + 1e1 + 2e2) +R  e
2
2
2

= s2:
Note that these are (weakly) lower than the rst-best levels. Expected indirect total surplus
when agents with skill levels 1 and 2 produce jointly (sharecrop) using contract (s; R) is
then
JMH(s) = 12 + 1e
MH
1 + 2e
MH
2  
(eMH1 )
2
2
  (e
MH
2 )
2
2
=
= 12 + 
2
1

(1  s)  1
2
(1  s)2

+ 22

s  1
2
s2

. (6)
The optimal sharing rule, s (the tenants crop share) is chosen to maximize indirect joint
surplus (6), which incorporates the partiesincentive compatible e¤orts, eMHi .
11 It is:
s =
22
21 + 
2
2
. (7)
Intuitively, the optimal tenant share s is higher the greater is the tenants ability relative
to the landlords ability. This follows from the fact that ability and e¤ort are complements
in the production function, and so the higher is ability the greater is e¤ort for the same
share. The marginal gain from raising the share to elicit greater e¤ort is therefore increasing
in agents ability. Since our assumptions on the range of i imply s 2 (0; 1), we interpret
the optimal contract in joint production under moral hazard as a sharecropping agreement.
Substituting s in (6) and simplifying, we obtain the following expression for the maxi-
mized value of joint surplus under sharecropping by agents with skills 1 and 2,
JMH(1; 2) = 12 +
1
2

21 + 
2
2  
21
2
2
21 + 
2
2

. (8)
10See Bhattacharya and Lafontaine (1995) for su¢ cient conditions under which the optimal sharing rule
under double-sided moral hazard can be represented by a linear contract without loss of generality. These
conditions are satised in our setting. Additionally, we assume that there is no budget-breaker and the
rst-best cannot be achieved as in Holmstrom (1982).
11The same optimal sharing rule obtains if we maximize one partys payo¤ subject to a participation
constraint by the other.
9
Note that, because of the incentive problem, the modularity of indirect joint surplus under
moral hazard, JMH cannot be inferred directly from the substitutability or separability of
agent characteristics in the production function qJ(:; :) as we did in the rst-best (or, as in
Becker, 1973; Sattinger, 1975). Now it also depends on the endogenous choices by the parties
and the sharing rule. The optimal share of each party is function of the magnitude of her
ability relative to the other partys ability. The higher is 1, the share of the task 1 specialist
goes up while the share of the task 2 specialist goes down, and as a result, e1 goes up and e2
goes down. The positive e¤ect of an increase in 2 on the share s and e2 (relative to e1) is
therefore lower the higher is 1. In other words, given that ability and e¤ort are complements
in production, a high-quality agents skills are best utilized if he also has strong incentives,
but the higher the quality of the other agent, this will not be the case. This is the intuition
for the fact that the skills of the agents engaged in sharecropping under moral hazard can
be substitutes in joint surplus see (9).
Finally, if a task i = 1; 2 specialist performs both tasks (sole production), since there are
no incentive problems, total surplus is S(i) as obtained in (5) in the previous section.
2.3 Matching and organization forms under moral hazard
Denoting, as before a = (a)2 and b = (b)2 with a  1 and b  1, for any a; b 2  with
a  b, and calling MH(i; j)  maxfS(i); JMH(i; j)g for (i; j) 2 f(a; a); (a; b); (b; b)g, using
(5) and (8), the expressions for indirect expected total surplus under moral hazard are:
MH(a; a) =
1
2
maxf2pa+ a+ 1; 2a+ 3
2
ag
MH(a; b) =
1
2
maxf2pa+ a+ 1; 2
p
ab+ a+ b  ab
a+ b
g (9)
MH(b; b) =
1
2
maxf2
p
b+ b+ 1; 2b+
3
2
bg:
The equilibrium organization forms and matching pattern thus depend on the values of
a; b and . Below, we rst analyze the case  = 0 in which we show that the equilibrium
displays negative assortative matching (henceforth, NAM) consisting of heterogeneous agent
pairs a; b for any a; b 2  with a  b. We also characterize the joint-surplus maximizing
organization form depending on the values of a and b. For most of the analysis we assume
that the two skill levels di¤er, i.e., a > b, and so a > b. We analyze the special case a = b
(a = b) separately.
2.3.1 Moral hazard and negative assortative matching
Assume  = 0 in this section. Therefore we have, from (9):
MH(a; a) =
1
2
maxfa+ 1; 3
2
ag, MH(a; b) = 1
2
fa+ 1; a+ b  ab
a+ b
g
and MH(b; b) =
1
2
maxfb+ 1; 3
2
bg. (10)
We have the following result.
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Proposition 2 (NAM under moral hazard)
Let  = 0. For any a > b  1,
MH(a; b) >
1
2
[MH(a; a) + MH(b; b)], (*)
that is, the indirect expected joint payo¤ function MH is strictly sub-modular
and the equilibrium matching is negative assortative (NAM).
Proof: There are four cases to consider:
Case (a): b < a < 2. Then, from (10), MH(a; a) = a+1
2
and MH(b; b) = b+1
2
since
a; b < 2. Also, MH(a; b) = a+1
2
since a + 1 > a + b   ab
a+b
is equivalent to a > b2   b. The
latter is true since b2   b < b for b < 2 and so a > b > b2   b. Thus, in Case (a) sole
production is optimal in all skill type pairs. Inequality (*) holds since it is equivalent to
a > b.
Case (b): b < 2  a. Then, from (10), using similar arguments as in Case (a), we
have: MH(a; a) = 3
4
a, MH(b; b) = b+1
2
and MH(a; b) = a+1
2
. Thus, (*) is equivalent to
a+ 1 > 3
4
a+ b+1
2
or a
4
+ 1
2
> b
2
, which is true since a  2 and b < 2.
Case (c): 2  b < a and a  b2   b. Then, from (10), MH(a; a) = 3
4
a, MH(b; b) = 3
4
b
and MH(a; b) = 1
2
(a+ b  ab
a+b
). In this case for a; b joint production is surplus-maximizing
for all skill type pairs. Inequality (*) is now equivalent to a+ b  ab
a+b
> 3
4
(a+ b) which, after
simplifying, reduces to (a  b)2 > 0.
Case (d): 2  b < a and a > b2   b. Then, from (10), MH(a; a) = 3
4
a, MH(b; b) = 3
4
b
and MH(a; b) = a+1
2
> 1
2
(a+ b  ab
a+b
) (see Case (a) for the last inequality). Thus,
MH(a; b) >
1
2
(a+ b  ab
a+ b
) >
3
8
a+
3
8
b =
1
2
(MH(a; a) + MH(b; b))
using the same argument as in Case (c) to show the second inequality.
Overall, we showed that inequality (*) holds for all a > b  1. It corresponds to Condition
H in LN(2002), which implies perfectly heterogeneous matching in equilibrium (see LN, 2002,
p. 933). Since there are only two possible skill levels in our model, inequality (*) also implies
that the indirect joint payo¤ function MH is strictly sub-modular, i.e., since MH is also
symmetric, by Proposition 7 in LN(2002), the equilibrium sorting pattern is NAM.
Comparing with the result from Proposition 1, Proposition 2 implies that the presence
of agency costs can reverse the equilibrium matching pattern relative to the rst best.12
Specically, for  = 0 we showed that PAM obtains in the rst best but NAM obtains
under moral hazard the presence of moral hazard not only implies the usual loss of surplus
from agency costs but also the opposite sorting pattern. Suppose we have sharecropping
in heterogeneous pairs (a; b) in equilibrium under moral hazard (see Corollary A below
for conditions) and would like to assess the welfare loss relative to the rst-best outcome.
12See also Legros and Newman (1996) and Alonso-Pauli and Perez-Castrillo (2012) for related results and
also Kaya and Vereshchagina (2010) who study matching with double-sided moral hazard and show that,
depending on whether types and e¤orts are substitutes or complements, positive or negative assortative
matching results.
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If we took the (a; b) pairs as exogenously given, in isolation, then resolving the moral
hazard problem would indicate a smaller increase in welfare compared to the gains that
would obtain when the parties are allowed to endogenously re-match in PAM pattern, as
they optimally would in the rst best (Proposition 1). Conversely, if we started from the
rst-best benchmark, the welfare loss due to moral hazard may be overstated if, keeping the
matching xed, we were to compute the agency cost due to moral hazard. Therefore, agency
costs are higher under exogenous matching compared to under endogenous matching.
Corollary A to Proposition 2 (optimal organization forms with moral
hazard and NAM)
(a) If 2  b < a and a  b2   b, then the optimal organizational form is
sharecropping in heterogeneous pairs, (a; b). For all other a; b with a > b  1
the optimal organization form is sole production by the high-skill agents, a with
own land (xed wage) or with rented land (xed rent).
(b) If b = a = 2, then for b < 2 sole production by all agents is optimal and for
b  2 sharecropping by all in (; ) pairs is optimal.
Proof: the results follow directly from the discussion of the four cases listed in
the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 and its Corollary A imply that, with double-sided moral hazard and en-
dogenous matching, when joint surplus is sub-modular, sharecropping will be observed in
equilibrium only if the skill levels of both parties are: (i) su¢ ciently large so that gains from
specialization are large, and (ii) relatively similar since, due to NAM, with skill hetero-
geneity sole production is more likely to dominate joint production. Specically, Corollary
A, part (a) implies that a necessary condition to observe sharecropping in equilibrium is
that the lower skill level b (=
p
b) be larger or equal to
p
2. Also, note we can re-write the
condition a  b2  b as a  b  b2  2b. Since b2  2b is increasing in b for b  1, the smaller
is b (b), the smaller the (squared) skill di¤erence a   b must be for sharecropping to be
optimally chosen in equilibrium.
Discussion and comparison with Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) study the choice of organization form in agriculture with
double-sided moral hazard by taking pairs of agents with certain skill levels in isolation.
We extend their analysis by recasting the basic model in a matching setting and study
the choice of optimal organization form and equilibrium sorting pattern with endogenous
matching between many agents.
We rst derive conditions in our setting analogous to those in EK (1985), for two exoge-
nously given agents (agent 1, a landlord and agent 2, a tenant) with skill levels 1 and 2 in
, respectively. Maintain the assumption  = 0 for this sub-section. As seen before, there
are three possible organization forms: (i) the agents produce jointly subject to the double-
sided moral hazard problem (sharecropping); (ii) Agent 1, the landlord, is sole producer
(paying unskilled workers xed wage); and (iii) Agent 2, the tenant, is sole producer paying
the landlord a xed rent. Since output is increasing in the skill level, in forms (ii) and (iii)
it is optimal that the higher-skill agent be the sole producer.
The next Proposition re-states Eswaran and Kotwals (1985) results in our context:
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Proposition 3
An exogenously given pair of agents with skills 1; 2 2  with 1  2 would
optimally use sharecropping if and only if 2 
p
2 and 21  42  22. Otherwise,
sole production by the high-skill type, 1 (a xed rent or xed wage arrangement)
maximizes expected joint surplus. If the agentsskill levels are equal, 1 = 2 = ,
then sharecropping is joint-surplus maximizing if and only if   p2 and sole
production is joint-surplus maximizing otherwise.
Proof: (see Appendix)
To illustrate the importance of endogenous sorting, suppose we took an isolated single
pair of agents of the same skill, 1 = 2 = . By Proposition 3, sharecropping would be
optimally chosen if and only if
 
p
2 (11)
Note that condition (11) is stronger than the corresponding condition for the rst best (  1)
derived in Lemma 1, which is intuitive given the presence of agency costs.
If there are two skill levels a and b in  that each satisfy (11) and if two (a; a)
and (b; b) homogeneous pairs were given exogenously, in isolation, we would conclude that
sharecropping would be the only contractual form observed in the economy. For example, if
we think of these agent pairs as living in two separate villages, we would expect to observe
only sharecropping and no xed wage or rent in each location. By taking landlord-tenant
pairs in isolation and inferring the contractual form they would choose we, however, ignore the
possibility that such pair of agents may never match in equilibrium with endogenous sorting.
To see this, suppose there are a couple of tenants and a couple of landlords from each skill
level a and b that is, four agents in total. If they can match with any partner they want
to, sharecropping may no longer be joint-surplus maximizing even if it were optimal when the
pairs (a; a) and (b; b) are studied in isolation. Indeed, the sub-modularity of indirect joint
surplus under moral hazard shown in Proposition 2 implies that if sharecropping is optimal
agent pairs must take the heterogeneous form (a; b). Therefore, with endogenous matching,
it is no longer the case that sharecropping is joint-surplus maximizing for any a and b
satisfying (11). Instead, Proposition 2 and Corollary A imply that, for any a > b 
p
2,
if the high-skilled type is su¢ ciently productive so that 2a > 
4
b   2b (this is equivalent to
a > b2   b), then sole production by the high-skill agents achieves higher expected joint
surplus than sharecropping. For instance, 2a > 
4
b   2b always holds when b =
p
2. Hence,
with endogenous matching, we would not observe sharecropping in our economy with double-
sided moral hazard populated with two agents with skill b =
p
2 and two with skill any
a >
p
2.
Graphically, for any landlord and tenant skill levels 1 and 2 in , the (
2
1; 
2
2) parameter
space can be divided into three areas depicted on Figure 1.
A1. xed wagearea corresponding to the set f(1; 2) : 1  2 and 21 > 42   22g
A2. xed rentarea corresponding to the set f(1; 2) : 2  1 and 22 > 41   21g
A3. sharecropping area corresponding to the set f(1; 2) : 1  2 and 21 
42   22g [ f(1; 2) : 2  1 and 22  41   21g
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Looking at Figure 1, sharecropping is optimal (maximizes expected joint surplus) only
when both agents have relatively high (here, above
p
2) and not too dissimilar skill levels
1; 2. This is similar to Eswaran and Kotwal (1985). However, Eswaran and Kotwal focus
on the contract that maximizes total surplus for any given pair of skill levels, i.e., they
characterize the contractual frontier for all possible agent pairs but are silent on which
matches and what organization forms are expected to arise in equilibrium. We extend
and complement their analysis by embedding the double-moral hazard setting in a matching
model and show that sharecropping may no longer be optimal for the same parameter values.
For instance, on Figure 1 suppose we take two agents in isolation at either point A (both low-
skill) or at point C (both high-skill). Since (11) is satised at both points A and C, taking
each of these pairs in isolation, we would conclude that sharecropping will be observed in
both. If we consider, instead, an economy with all four agents together and allowed to
match endogenously, the joint expected surplus from two heterogeneous sharecropping pairs,
corresponding to points B and D is higher than that from the two homogeneous pairs at points
A and C (see Proposition 2). However, for the skill levels corresponding to points B and
D, sharecropping in heterogeneous pair is dominated by other contractual forms (xed wage
or xed rent) in which the high-skilled agent is a sole producer. That is, with endogenous
matching no sharecropping would be observed in this economy.
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Contrast the above discussion with another scenario in which we start with two isolated
pairs at points E and G on Figure 1 (i.e., when the di¤erence between the higher and lower
skill levels is smaller than that in A and C). With exogenously given homogeneous pairs
at E and G, by (11), we have sharecropping as joint-surplus maximizing. Unlike in the
ABCD example, however, with all four agents together free to match with anyone they like,
Proposition 2 and Corollary A imply that we would still observe sharecropping in equilibrium
but in heterogeneous pairs corresponding to the points H and F. This has implications about
the optimal crop share (we come back to this in Section 3).
Expected output
Using our previous results expression (6) and the discussion right after, it is easy to
compute expected total output in equilibrium with double-sided moral hazard depending
on the values for the agent skill levels, the parameters a and b (we still hold  = 0).
Under sole production by skill type k = a; b, it is easy to verify that expected total output is
qMHS (k; k) = k+1; in a homogeneous sharecropping pair with skills k, it is q
MH
J (k; k) = k; and
in a heterogeneous sharecropping pair, expected total output is qMHJ (a; b) =
a2+b2
a+b
.
Look back at Figure 1, points ABCD (the case 2  b < a and a > b2   b, calling b the
squared skill level at A and a that at C). With exogenously given agent pairs at points A
and C (homogeneous sharecropping pairs), total expected output is a+ b. With endogenous
matching, by Proposition 2 and Corollary A, sole production by the high-skill types (at points
B and D) is optimal, yielding total expected output 2a+ 2 strictly higher. Note that the
di¤erence in expected output between the exogenous and endogenous cases is increasing in
the (squared) skill di¤erence a  b.
Consider now Figure 1, points EFGH (the case 2  b < a and a  b2   b). With
isolated pairs at points E and G (homogeneous sharecropping pairs), total expected output
is a + b. With endogenous matching, by Proposition 2 and Corollary A, sharecropping in
heterogeneous pairs at points F and H is optimal, yielding total expected output 2(a
2+b2
a+b
).
The di¤erence in expected output between the two cases is 2(a
2+b2
a+b
)   (a + b) which equals
(a b)2
a+b
. Thus, total expected output is once again higher under endogenous matching and the
output di¤erence is increasing in a  b.
Wealth constraints
In the above analysis it was assumed that all three organization forms (sharecropping,
xed wage, xed rent) are feasible for all types of agents. In particular, if sole production by
high-skill tenants (xed rentcontract) occurs in equilibrium (see Corollary A, part (a)),
it was assumed that these tenants have su¢ cient wealth to pay the rent. However, if they
do not have the resources to rent the land (e.g., suppose they are poor and paying the rent
upfront is required), then this organization form is infeasible and the next best form has to
be chosen, which is either sharecropping or sole production by the low-skill landlord. Notice
that this introduces an asymmetry in the joint payo¤ MH(a; b) since a high-skill landlord
can still engage in sole production. The equilibrium outcome under endogenous matching
can be thus a¤ected by the presence of wealth constraints. The full analysis of the possibility
of wealth constraints remains outside the scope of our paper but we address it here by the
following example.
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Example A Wealth constraints
Suppose the model parameters are as in Case (a) in the proof of Proposition 2, i.e.,
b < a < 2. If wealth constraints are not present, we know from Proposition 2 and Corollary
A that sole production (xed rent or wage) by the high-skill landlords or tenants is joint-
surplus maximizing. Suppose, however, wealth constraints prevent high-skill tenants from
sole production (xed-rent contract). High-skill landlords can still produce on their own
(xed wage). Thus, the form of MH(a; b) now depends on whether the high-skill party is
a landlord or a tenant. We have MH(a; b) = MHL (a; b)  12 maxfa + 1; a + b   aba+b) if the
high-skill agent is landlord (as before), but MH(a; b) = MHT (a; b)  12(a + b   aba+b) with
wealth constraints the only option for a high-skill tenant is to sharecrop with a low-skill
landlord. Hence, in Case (a) in Proposition 2, for b < a < 2, if
MHL (a; b) + 
MH
T (a; b) > 
MH(a; a) + MH(b; b), (12)
which is equivalent to a + 1 + a + b   ab
a+b
> a + 1 + b + 1, i.e., to a2 > a + b, then there
is sole production by high-skill landlords and sharecropping between low-skill landlords and
high-skill tenants in equilibrium (instead of sole production by high-skill types in the case
without wealth constraints). For instance, this holds for a = 1:9 and b = 1:1. If instead,
b < a < 2 but a2 < a + b (e.g., a = 1:2 and b = 1:1), then (12) does not hold and NAM no
longer obtains in equilibrium for this case.
In contrast, take Case (c) in Proposition 2 (2  b < a and a  b2  b). Now, the presence
of wealth constraints does not a¤ect our previous results since the equilibrium consists of
sharecropping in heterogeneous pairs which is still feasible.
2.3.2 Comparison with a randomly drawn skill levels economy
In this sub-section we still maintain the assumption  = 0 (thus, Proposition 2 applies)
but allow the measure of agents to di¤er by skill level, as well as by task-specialization,
i.e., tenants vs. landlords. We compare the fraction of sharecropping units in our economy
(hereafter, the GK economy) with that which would obtain in an economy similar to
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), in which agents of di¤erent skill levels are drawn at random from
skill distributions with the same support and probability (hereafter, the EK economy).
Formally, let k 2 (0; 1) denote the fraction of low-skill agents (skill level b) of type
k = 1; 2 (landlords and tenants respectively). As before, call a  2a and b  2b to simplify
the notation, with a > b and a; b 2 [1; (max)2]. The case a = b is analyzed separately at the
end of this section. We study the equilibrium matching pattern depending on the values of
a and b (the support of the skill distribution) and the agent distribution by type and skill
levels, the values k. There are four relevant cases for a and b, as listed in the proof of
Proposition 2:
case (a): b < a < 2
case (b): b < 2  a
case (c): 2  b < a and a  b2   b
case (d): 2  b < a and a > b2   b
The case 1 = 2 = 1=2
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Begin with the case of equal measure of each of the two ability levels for both tenants
and landlords (1 = 2 = 1=2). This is the parametrization used in Section 2.2 and Figure
1. Proposition 2 implies that the equilibrium matching pattern is always NAM no matter
which organization form is optimally chosen. Thus, we have that in cases (a), (b) or (d)
for a; b (note case (d) corresponds to example ABCD on Figure 1), then MH(a; b) = S(a)
sole production by the high-skilled is optimal. Thus, in equilibrium we have high-skill
landlords producing alone and high-skill tenants producing alone renting land from the low-
skill landlords. There is no sharecropping. In case (c) for a; b (which corresponds to example
EFGH on Figure 1) we have MH(a; b) = JMH(a; b) sharecropping in heterogeneous pairs
obtains in equilibrium due to NAM and the fact that S(a) is dominated. All agents are
involved in sharecropping.
Compare these results with randomly drawing a landlord and a tenant from the corre-
sponding skill distributions (the same a, b, 1 and 2) and looking at them in isolation as
in Eswaran-Kotwal (1985). Sharecropping would be chosen if we draw skill values 1 and 2
that are both in the triangularregion in the middle of Figure 1. Thus, in case (a) for a; b
there is no sharecropping in both the GK economy (our model with endogenous matching)
and the EK economy (the setting with isolated pairs). In case (b) the probability of share-
cropping in the EK economy is 1/4 (the probability of drawing two a skill levels), while, as
explained above, in the GK economy the fraction of sharecropping contracts in equilibrium
is zero. In case (c) the fraction of sharecropping in both the EK and GK economies equals
1. Finally, in case (d) the probability of sharecropping in the EK economy is 1/2 (the prob-
ability of drawing two a skills or two b skills), whereas in the GK economy the fraction of
sharecropping pairs is zero.
We next look at the general case 1; 2 2 (0; 1) and obtain the following result.
Proposition 4
In an economy in which a pair of types is drawn at random (the EK economy),
there is a (weakly) higher likelihood of sharecropping than in an economy in which
agents have skill levels whose measures and supports coincide with the probability
distribution over skills in the EK economy and in which agents can match en-
dogenously (the GK economy). This holds for any skill levels a; b 2  with
a  b and any probability/measure distribution 1; 2 2 (0; 1) over the two
skill levels where i, i = 1; 2 denotes the probability/measure of low-skill task i
specialists.
Proof: (see Appendix)
Proposition 4 shows that in an economy in which agents with di¤erent abilities are drawn
at random there is a higher likelihood of sharecropping being the optimally chosen (surplus-
maximizing) contractual form than in an economy with the same distribution of abilities
but in which there is endogenous matching. This is a consequence of the NAM result shown
earlier. Proposition 4 holds for any distribution of skill levels over agent types which further
emphasizes the general message that selection e¤ects are crucial to understand the nature
of equilibrium contracts.
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2.3.3 Moral hazard and positive assortative matching
In Proposition 2 we showed that for  = 0, for any a > b  1 the inequality MH(a; b) >
1
2
[MH(a; a) + MH(b; b)] holds, and hence there is negative assortative matching in equilib-
rium. By continuity, the same result holds for su¢ ciently small and positive . In this section
we show that for  su¢ ciently large there can be positive assortative matching (PAM) in
equilibrium under moral hazard. Since for  6= 0 the algebra in computing and comparing
MH(i; j) for i; j 2 fa; bg becomes intractable, we only provide su¢ cient conditions for PAM.
Proposition 5 (PAM under moral hazard su¢ cient conditions)
Suppose the following su¢ cient conditions hold: (i)   1=2; (ii) a > b  2; and
(iii) a  b2   b. Then
MH(a; b) <
1
2
[MH(a; a) + MH(b; b)] (**)
which implies that the equilibrium matching pattern in the economy is positive
assortative of the segregation type.
Given   1=2, weaker but messierforms of the su¢ cient conditions (ii) and (iii) in the
Proposition statement can be derived using (15) and (16) from the proof of Proposition 5 in
the Appendix. Specically, for   1=2, the left-hand side of (15), (k
2
  1) + 2(k  pk) 
3
2
k pk 1 which is non-negative for pk  1+
p
7
3
 1:22, i.e., b  (1:22)2 is a weaker version
of condition (ii). Similarly, for   1=2, (16) implies that b2  (a+ b)[1 pa(pb  1)] is a
weaker version of condition (iii).
Suppose the su¢ cient conditions (i)(iii) in Proposition 5 are satised. Then, the optimal
organization form is sharecropping in homogeneous pairs, (a; a) and (b; b). Now the logic
from the ABCD example depicted in Figure 1 goes the other way. In particular, if we started
with two heterogeneous agent pairs at points B and D in isolation, we would conclude
that no sharecropping would be observed. However, with endogenous matching allowed,
sharecropping in homogeneous pairs corresponding to points A and C is the equilibrium
outcome.
3 Discussion and Implications
In this section we discuss some applications and potentially testable implications of the
theoretical analysis in Section 2.
1. Share equality and/or uniformity
Our results imply that, with double-sided moral hazard and endogenous matching, the
optimal shares observed in sharecropping would typically be equal to or close to 1=2. In the
PAM case supposing there are multiple agents of each skill level and the conditions given
in Proposition 5 hold, then with endogenous matching we would observe only sharecropping
pairs between agents of equal skills and hence optimal share s from (7) equal to 1=2 in
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each.13 No other sharing rules would be observed. In addition, as long as the lowest skill
level satises (11), all agents would use sharecropping and all will use a share of one-half
a uniform sharing rule across all production units independent of skill levels. Therefore,
in the PAM case, our model gives an alternative explanation for why the observed share in
most studies of sharecropping is clustered around 50:50.14
In the NAM case (see Proposition 2 and discussion afterwards), (7) implies that the
optimal shares in a (a; b) sharecropping pair are
2a
2a+
2
b
and 
2
b
2a+
2
b
. From the discussion
after Figure 1, the optimal share when sharecropping is observed in equilibrium would be
close to an equal split. The intuition is the same as in Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)  if
the skill di¤erence between agents is too high, any gains from specialization are smaller
and cannot o¤set the agency costs. This is an attractive feature of theirs and our model
given the predominance of such shares in data. What is new here, is that accounting for
endogenous matching makes the dispersion in skill levels for which sharecropping is optimal
narrower than if agent pairs were taken in isolation (e.g., see Figure 1, points E and G vs.
points A and C). More specically, an implication of our model is that the lower the low-skill
value b, the lower is the maximum possible deviation between 1=2 and the optimal share
with endogenous matching. Indeed, by Corollary A, given b, the maximum high-skill agent
share that can be observed in equilibrium is smax = b
2 b
b2
= 1   1
b
. It is obtained by setting
a = b2   b. Obviously, for low values of b the value smax is close to 1/2 (e.g., if b =
p
2,
sharecropping can only be observed for a = b and then s = smax = 1=2).15 Only if the
minimum skill level b in the economy is large can shares substantially di¤er from 1/2 in
equilibrium.
2. Within vs. across group heterogeneity
Suppose NAM obtains under double-sided moral hazard (e.g., the case  = 0). This
means that there is more heterogeneity within groups (sharecropping pairs), but less het-
erogeneity across pairs. In our simple two-skill (a; b), four-agent example on Figure 1,
the joint surplus in both pairs H and F is the same. While we do not determine the exact
individual payo¤s, we showed that the optimal output shares in a heterogeneous pair are
unequal which would result in general in unequal surplus shares. If, instead, we had posi-
tive sorting as in Proposition 5, there is no intra-group inequality but there is inter-group
inequality. The endogenous sorting pattern can therefore have implications about inequality
in the economy as a whole.
3. Unobserved ability
Negative sorting implies that landlord-tenant pairs are heterogeneous in equilibrium
(Proposition 2). If skill level is not directly measured but instead proxied (e.g., by wealth),
such heterogeneity is often interpreted as suggestive of risk-sharing the relatively less risk-
averse (richer) party insures the more risk-averse (poorer) party. We provide an alternative
explanation for heterogeneous matching which does not rely on risk aversion and insurance
motives.
4. Variance of observed shares
13This result applies more generally, for more than two skill levels PAM results in more homogeneous
matches and thus in optimal shares closer to 1/2 relative to NAM (see Ghatak and Karaivanov, 2011).
14See Young and Burke (2001) for a theory based on coformity to custom.
15Remember, we must have b  2 in order to have sharecropping in equilibrium and so smax 2 [ 12 ; 1).
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A prediction of our model is that, holding other things equal, the observed distribution of
crop shares would have greater variance under negative sorting than under positive sorting.
5. Variance of output
As shown earlier, total output in a sharecropping pair of agents with skills 1 and 2
under double-sided moral hazard equals:
12 +
41 + 
4
2
21 + 
2
2
= 12 + 
2
1 + 
2
2  
221
2
2 
21 + 
2
2

Hence, if  = 0 or positive but not too high, like we did with joint surplus MH (see
Proposition 2), it can be shown that total output is sub-modular in 1 and 2. This implies
that the variance of output across production units will be lower with negative sorting
compared to with positive sorting. This observation, together with point 4 above, could be
potentially useful to infer the likely matching pattern in sharecropping data when skills are
unobservable to the researcher.
6. Skewness of the income distribution
With positive sorting Kremer (1993) shows that the income distribution is skewed to the
right. His model has no agency problems, just a production function with complementarity
in skills, y = A12 which leads to PAM and homogeneous groups (with 1 = 2) being
formed. Kremer shows that a given skill gap a   b > 0 translates into an income gap
proportional to 2a   2b . Hence, with positive sorting, the income distribution in Kremers
economy is more skewed than the skill distribution.
Similar logic applies in our setting under moral hazard. Suppose  = 0 and look at
sharecropping in an exogenously given (; ) pair with   p2. Total surplus is pos  342
see (8), where  is a or b. Assuming equal surplus sharing, each party earns income 38
2
which is proportional to the square of her skill level, as in Kremers model. Calling a = 2a
and b = 2b , note that the income di¤erence across agents of di¤erent skills would be
3
8
(a  b)
if we took the (a; a) and (b; b) pairs in isolation.
The income distribution is in fact more skewed under negative endogenous sorting for
the same a > b 
p
2 and  = 0. Suppose the conditions in Corollary A are satised so
that heterogeneous sharecropping units are optimal (a and b are as in Case (c) in the proof
of Proposition 2). From (8), each such unit has total surplus neg  12(a + b   aba+b). The
optimal share of the high-skill party is s = a
a+b
. Thus, assuming no other transfers, she
earns expected income sneg while the low-skilled agent earns (1  s)neg. Therefore, the
di¤erence between the incomes of the high- and low-skill agents is:
(2s   1)neg = 1
2
(a  b)[1  ab
(a+ b)2
] >
3
8
(a  b)
since ab
(a+b)2
< 1
4
. Thus, the income distribution is more skewed under negative endogenous
sorting compared to if agents were exogenously paired into homogeneous (a; a) and (b; b)
units. Intuitively, the unequal share s further biases income in favor of the high-skill agents
incentive reasons dictate that they earn higher share of total surplus, which enhances the
rewards to skill in addition to what comes solely from technology. The reversal in equilibrium
matching from positive to negative in the presence of moral hazard thus may increase income
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inequality above and beyond the purely technological complementarity reasons identied by
Kremer.
4 Conclusions
We analyze contractual arrangements between risk-neutral landowners and tenants taking
as benchmark the classical model of Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) in which sharecropping ex-
ploits absolute advantage in two separate tasks but is subject to double-sided moral hazard.
We study the consequences of allowing endogenous matching of landowners and tenants. We
show that the presence of moral hazard can reverse the equilibrium matching pattern relative
to the rst best. Even if sharecropping is optimal (joint-surplus maximizing) for an exoge-
nously given agent pair, with endogenous matching sharecropping may not be observed in
equilibrium. An important implication of these results is that, in the distribution of possible
contractual forms, sharecropping is less likely to be observed in equilibrium if matching is
endogenous. This involves an e¢ ciency loss because some optimal sharecropping arrange-
ments do not form due to agency costs which must be taken into account, in addition to the
usual e¢ ciency loss coming directly from agency costs in an exogenously given sharecropping
contract.
In the working paper version (Ghatak and Karaivanov, 2011) we investigate conditions
that lead to sub- or super-modularity of the indirect joint surplus function under double-sided
moral hazard and endogenous matching under general forms for the production and e¤ort cost
functions. In the double-sided moral hazard setting, the connection between substitutability
in skills and modularity of joint surplus is not clear ex-ante due to the endogenous choice
of e¤ort levels and optimal sharing rule. We demonstrate that the modularity of indirect
joint surplus depends on the degree of substitutability in agents skills but the degree of
substitutability in agent e¤orts plays an additional important role.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Call m = 21 and n = 
2
2. Given (8), for any 1  2 joint production would be chosen if
and only if it yields higher expected total surplus, i.e., if
1
2
(m+ n  mn
m+ n
)  1
2
(m+ 1) . (13)
Simplifying this, the condition for sharecropping to maximize expected joint surplus is:
m  n2   n. (14)
By assumption, n  m. For (14) to hold, we need 2 =
p
n  p2 (otherwise, n2   n < n)
and m  n2 n for any such p2  2  1. Conversely, if 2 
p
2 (n  2), then n2 n  n,
and so, for any m  n with m  n2   n (such m exist for n  2) inequality (13) holds,
i.e., sharecropping with share s from (7) achieves higher expected joint surplus than sole
production by the high-skill agent. If 2 =
p
n <
p
2 (which implies n2   n < n  m), or
if 2 
p
2 but m > n2   n, then by (13) sole production by the high-skill agent achieves
higher expected total surplus.
For the case of equal skills, note that if 1 = 2 =  (i.e., m = n = 
2) then (13) is
equivalent to m  2 or   p2.
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Proof of Proposition 4
We already showed the proposition result for the case 1 = 2 = 1=2 in the main text. We
consider the remaining possibilities for 1; 2 2 (0; 1) in turn. We rst analyze the unequal
skills case a > b in points 1-4 below. The special case a = b is considered separately in
point 5.
1. 1 = 2 =  < 1=2 equal measure of each skill per agent type (landlord or tenant)
but less low-skill than high-skill agents overall.
Proposition 2 still implies NAM in equilibrium in the GK economy. However, in this
case there are not enough low-skill agents to match all agents in NAM pairs. Hence, the
equilibrium sorting pattern is to match as many as possible agents in NAM pairs and the
rest, 1   2 in homogeneous (a; a) pairs. By Proposition 2, any other matching will be
blocked. Existence of any (b; b) pairs in equilibrium or of more than measure 1   2 of
(a; a) pairs (which would imply the existence of (b; b) pairs), leads to a contradiction
as two (a; b) pairs achieve higher joint surplus than two homogeneous pairs (a; a) and
(b; b). Therefore, we have the following results depending on the values of a and b and
using analogous arguments as in the case 1 = 2 = 1=2.
In case (a) for a and b there is no sharecropping in both the EK and GK economies.
In case (b) the probability of sharecropping in the EK economy is (1  )2 (the probability
of drawing two a skilled agents) while in the GK economy the fraction of sharecropping
pairs is strictly lower, (1  2)2 (since in case (b) sharecropping is joint surplus maximizing
for (a; a) pairs, see Corollary A to Proposition 2). In case (c) the probability/fraction of
sharecropping in both the EK and GK economies is equal to 1. In case (d) the probability
of sharecropping in the EK economy is 2 + (1   )2 (see Proposition 3), while in the GK
economy the fraction of sharecropping pairs is strictly lower, (1  2)2, as in case (b).
2. 1 = 2 =  > 1=2 equal measure of each skill per agent type (landlord or tenant)
but more low-skill than high-skill agents overall.
Proceed analogously to point 1 above. Now there are not enough a agents to match
everyone in NAM pairs. Hence, the equilibrium sorting is to match as many as possible
agents in NAM pairs and the rest, 2 1 in homogeneous (b; b) pairs. In case (a) for a and
b there is no sharecropping in both the EK and GK economies. In case (b) the probability
of sharecropping in the EK economy is (1   )2 while in the GK economy the fraction of
sharecropping in equilibrium is strictly lower, equal to zero (since sole production is joint
surplus maximizing for (b; b) pairs, see Corollary A). In case (c) the probability/fraction of
sharecropping in both EK and GK economies is 1. In case (d) the probability of sharecropping
in the EK economy is 2 + (1  )2 while in the GK economy the corresponding fraction is
lower, (2  1)2 by the same arguments as in point 1 above.
3. 1 6= 2 with 1 + 2  1.
Now there are not enough agents of one of the low-skill types to match all agents in
NAM pairs. Hence, the equilibrium sorting is to match as many as possible agents in NAM
pairs and the rest, 1  1  2 (could be zero) in homogeneous high-skill (a; a) pairs. Note
that 1  1   2 and 2  1   1 so 1 + 2 heterogeneous pairs can always be formed.
Proceeding as before, we have that, in case (a) for a and b, there is no sharecropping in
both the EK and GK economies. In case (b), the probability of sharecropping in the EK
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economy is (1  1)(1  2) while in the GK economy the corresponding fraction is strictly
lower, (1   1   2)2. This is true since (1   1)(1   2) > (1   1   2)2 is equivalent to
(1 + 2)(1   1   2) + 12 > 0. In case (c), the probability/fraction of sharecropping
in both the EK and GK economies is 1. In case (d), by Proposition 3, the probability of
sharecropping in the EK economy is 12 + (1   1)(1   2) while in the GK economy the
corresponding fraction is strictly lower, (1  1   2)2.
4. 1 6= 2 with 1 + 2 > 1.
This is analogous to point 3 above but now there are not enough agents of one of the
high-skill types to match all agents in NAM pairs. Hence, the equilibrium sorting is to match
as many as possible agents in NAM pairs and the rest, 1+ 2  1 in homogeneous low-skill
(b; b) pairs. In case (a) for a and b, there is no sharecropping in both the EK and GK
economies. In case (b) the probability of sharecropping in the EK economy is (1  1)(1 
2), while in the GK economy the corresponding fraction is 0 since by Proposition 2 sole
production is optimal for (b; b) tenant-landlord pair. In case (c) the probability/fraction
of sharecropping in both the EK and GK economies is 1. In case (d), the probability of
sharecropping in the EK economy is 12 + (1   1)(1   2) while in the GK economy the
corresponding fraction is strictly lower, (1 + 2   1)2 (this is shown as in point 3 above).
5. The special case a = b =  2  and 1; 2 2 (0; 1)
In this case a = b = 2, the measure of both landlords and tenants is one and all agents
have the same skill . We thus have MH(; ) = maxfS(); JMH(; )g = 1
2
maxfb+ 1; 3
2
bg.
By Corollary A, part (b), for b < 2 there is sole production by all agents in equilibrium
and for b  2 there is sharecropping by all agents in (; ) pairs in both the EK and GK
economies.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the expressions for expected joint surplus under moral hazard, (9). Note that
JMH(k; k)  S(k) for k = a; b is equivalent to
2k +
3
2
k  2
p
k + k + 1 or
(
k
2
  1) + 2(k  
p
k)  0. (15)
It is clear from (15) that k  2 is a su¢ cient condition for JMH(k; k)  S(k) for any   0.
Thus, under condition (ii) in the proposition statement, sharecropping is optimally chosen
in homogenous pairs, i.e., JMH achieves the maxima in MH(a; a) and MH(b; b).
Next, JMH(a; b)  S(a) is equivalent to
2
p
ab+ b  ab
a+ b
 2pa+ 1 or
b2  (a+ b)[1  2pa(
p
b  1)]. (16)
Condition (iii) in the Proposition statement implies that (16) holds for any   0, i.e.,
JMH(a; b)  S(a) for any a; b  1 satisfying a  b2   b.
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The above results ensure that JMH(i; j)  S(i) for (i; j) 2 f(a; a); (b; b); (a; b)g share-
cropping is optimal for any skills pair. Thus, MH(i; j) = JMH(i; j) for all i; j and so to
show (**) we only need to ensure that
JMH(a; b)  1
2
[JMH(a; a) + JMH(b; b)] < 0
which, using (9) and simplifying, is equivalent to
1
2
(
p
a 
p
b)2( 
2
+
(
p
a+
p
b)2
8(a+ b)
) < 0.
Note rst that (
p
a+
p
b)2
8(a+b)
< 1=4 is equivalent to (
p
a   pb)2 > 0 which is always true for
a > b. Thus, for any   1=2 we have (
p
a+
p
b)2
8(a+b)
< 1=4  
2
i.e., JMH(a; b)   1
2
[JMH(a; a) +
JMH(b; b)] < 0 for any a; b  1 and  satisfying (i)(iii).
The above results imply that the surplus function MH(a; b)  maxf0; MH(a; b)  
1
2
[MH(a; a) + MH(b; b)]g equals zero for a; b;  satisfying (i)(iii). Thus, as in Proposition
1, by Proposition 4 in LN(2002), we obtain PAM of the segregation type in equilibrium.
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